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The Soft Power of a Small State:




Since the end of the Cold War, Norway has widely functioned as 
facilitator for conflict resolution in interstate conflicts and, thus, 
constructed Norwegian foreign policy as an international peace 
promoter. This article provides a critical understanding of the 
discursive construction and institutional practices of Norwegian 
peace engagement and the effectiveness of the Norwegian approach 
in conflict resolution experiences. By utilising valuable insights from 
international relations theories, this article critically analyses the 
construction of identity and interests in Norwegian foreign policy 
discourse, focusing particularly on the balancing act between realist 
and idealist internationalism in peace engagement.  
Introduction
Why does a small country like Norway take on the role of peace 
facilitator in distant intrastate conflicts where it has no immediate 
self-interest, and what characterises and determines the choice 
of strategy in such peace engagement? Norwegian foreign policy 
has in recent years been marked by discourses and practices that 
construct Norway as an international peace promoter. Norway has 
functioned as facilitator for conflict resolution processes in several 
intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War, supplementing 
pre-existing roles as peacekeeper under United Nations (UN) 
leadership and donor of humanitarian and development aid. This 
new role as peace facilitator was given much publicity with the 
Israel-Palestine peace process in the early 1990s and has been 
furthered in other conflict situations since then, including in 
Colombia, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Norway has 
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also been involved in internationalised peace-building efforts in 
Sudan, Timor Leste, Haiti, Ethiopia, Nepal, and other countries. 
While the initial success of the Israel-Palestine peace process 
created optimism about Norwegian peace facilitation, the lack of 
substantive conflict resolution has raised critical questions about 
Norway’s approach and capability (Said, 2001; Waage, 2004).1 One 
decade after the Oslo process, Norway came under strong criticism 
in Sri Lanka, where Sinhalese nationalists argued that Norwegian 
peace facilitation was driven by economic interests in the island, 
constituted neo-imperialist interference in Sri Lankan sovereignty 
and was systematically biased in favour of the Tamil minority and 
insurgency. Against this background, the present article provides 
a critical analysis of the discursive construction and institutional 
practices of Norwegian peace engagement before examining how 
the Norwegian approach affected the dynamics and outcome of the 
Sri Lankan peace process.2
The puzzle that motivates this article is that Norway’s peace 
engagement in distant intrastate conflicts cannot be explained with 
reference to economic or security interests in the conflict zones. 
While Norway is thoroughly embedded in global relations and has 
economic interests far beyond its territorial borders, it is difficult to 
identify Norwegian strategic interests in places such as Colombia, 
Sri Lanka and the Philippines. This does not mean, however, that 
Norwegian peace engagement is a matter of mere altruism. Peace 
engagement may also serve Norwegian economic and security 
interests by reducing long-distance impacts of intrastate conflicts 
and grant recognition and influence that support the pursuit of 
Norwegian interests in international arenas. While it is notoriously 
difficult to prove the hypothesis that peace engagement supports 
Norwegian interests internationally, this claim has been made 
repeatedly and serves as a justification for engagement in distant 
conflicts (Matlary, 2002). The article, therefore, starts out by 
examining the construction of identity and interests in Norwegian 
foreign policy discourse, emphasising the balancing act between 
realist and idealist internationalism and how peace engagement 
has provided an opportunity for merging interests and ideals after 
the end of the Cold War. 
Given the discursive construction of Norway as a peace 
promoter, a key question regards the choice of approach to conflict 
resolution. This article observes that the characteristics of Norwegian 
peace engagement depend on context-specific constellations and 
dynamics, but also display commonalities across the diversity of 
conflicts. The Norwegian approach to peace engagement, I will 
argue, revolves around a set of institutionalised practices, including: 
(1) engagement in peace processes on the basis of invitation and 
mandate from the protagonists to a conflict; (2) impartial facilitation 
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of negotiations based on parity of status between the protagonists; 
(3) instrumental use of humanitarian and development aid to build 
peace; (4) close collaboration between the Norwegian state, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and like-minded international 
actors. This approach is based on the realisation that Norway has 
limited hard power capability in international relations and, thus, 
must rely on its ability to facilitate dialog between conflicting parties 
and mobilise international support for negotiated settlements and 
peace building. The Norwegian approach can, thus, be summarised 
as ‘the soft power of a small nation’. The Sri Lankan case 
demonstrates that this approach affects the character, dynamics, 
and outcome of peace processes where Norway plays a facilitator 
role. The failure of Sri Lanka’s peace process in turn raises critical 
questions about the feasibility of this approach and the future of 
Norway’s peace engagement in a changing global order. 
Interest and identity in international relations
Answering the question of why a small state in northern 
Europe engages in intrastate conflict resolution in the global South 
requires attention to its interests and identity. These are pivotal 
concepts in the study of international relations (IR), where a shift 
can be observed from a singular emphasis on objective interests 
to an additional focus on the discursive construction of identities 
and interests. The formative debates in international relations 
revolved around the values, interests and strategies of states, and 
the prospects for international collaboration. Whereas the liberal 
school holds that peaceful cooperation between states can be 
built on the basis of universal democratic values and converging 
interests, the realist school argues that international relations 
are defined by conflicts of interest between power-seeking states 
(Burchill et al., 2009). 
The contemporary expressions of these schools – neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism – converge around an understanding of states 
as strategic and rational actors that operate in a system in which 
there is no central authority to impose order. These approaches 
explain the behaviour of states with reference to their economic and 
security interests and capabilities (Waltz, 1979). Neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism part ways, however, on the possibility for sustained 
international cooperation. Whereas neo-realists see states as being 
preoccupied with their relative standing vis-á-vis other states 
in a zero-sum game, neo-liberalists hold that states are utility-
maximisers that will enter into cooperation if it yields absolute 
gains. The high degree of economic and political interdependence 
in the contemporary world means that states may achieve such 
absolute gains by collaborating on common concerns that cannot 
be effectively addressed by individual states. Such collaboration 
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includes, for instance, global security, international regulation of 
trade and finance, and global climate change mitigation (Keohane, 
1984). Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka has been explained 
with reference to both perspectives. Whereas Sinhalese nationalists 
have accused Norway of pursuing economic self-interests in the 
island, Norwegian diplomats have insisted that Norway has no 
strategic interests in Sri Lanka and that the facilitator role is 
motivated by a commitment to international peace and development 
cooperation. This article seeks to transcend this dichotomy by 
arguing that Norway’s peace engagement is motivated by both ideals 
and interests, and by arguing that Norway’s interests are located 
elsewhere than in the conflict zone and are pursued indirectly 
through value diplomacy.
Contemporary studies in international relations are also 
marked by a debate between the positivist traditions of neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism, on the one hand, and post-positivist traditions of 
constructivism and poststructuralism, on the other (Burchill et.al., 
2009). This debate revolves around the constructivists’ questioning 
of the materialist and rationalist assumptions of both neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism. It is argued that studies of international 
relations must also examine the ideas and beliefs that inform the 
actors, and how inter-subjective meaning is constructed. In contrast 
to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivists do not see 
interests as objectively defined but rather as social constructions. 
Constructivists acknowledge that actors pursue interests, but there 
is a need to understand how they define themselves and how this 
frames their interests. This makes identity the basis for interests 
and the discursive construction of identities an analytical entry 
point for understanding interests (Wendt, 1999). 
Discourse analysis in international relations examines how 
socially constructed identities frame foreign policy, making some 
political strategies seem natural and necessary while excluding 
others. A discourse constitutes a temporary fixing of meaning built 
around relatively stable nodal points, but discourses also contain 
unstable elements where the meaning of signifiers is floating 
(Sæther, 2008). This implies that discourses are never completely 
fixed or closed, but always contain spaces for contestation even 
though there is considerable inertia towards change (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001). Discourses and practices are mutually constitutive 
in the sense that discourses structure what actors do while, at 
the same time, are shaped by practices (Foucault 1988, 1995). 
Discourses construct meaning and define spaces for practice by 
normalising and legitimising certain kinds of intervention, but 
discourses may also be altered through alternative practices. The 
significance of this for this article is that it highlights both that 
Norwegian foreign policy and diplomatic practices are framed by 
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the discursive construction of Norway as a peace promoter, and 
that the Norwegian peace engagement discourse is based on actual 
practices of peace facilitation, humanitarian assistance, and 
development cooperation. This creates a mutually reinforcing logic 
where it becomes common sense to say that Norway is a peace 
promoter and to act as a peace facilitator and peace builder. Based 
on this observation, the following sections will examine Norwegian 
foreign policy and peace engagement discourse before turning to 
the institutional practices of peace facilitation with special focus on 
the Sri Lankan peace process.
Idealism and realism in Norwegian foreign policy
The recent growth in Norwegian peace engagement must be 
situated within the discursive construction of Norway’s identity and 
interests in international relations. A recurring theme in Norwegian 
foreign policy discourse is the central role of geographic factors 
– especially the small size of Norway – and also its geostrategic 
location and resource-based economy (Frydenlund, 1982; Leira, 
2007; Lunde, Thune, Fleischer, Grünfeld and Sending, 2008; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009; Riste, 2001; Støre, 2008). Riste 
(2001) observes, on the one hand, that the smallness of the country 
means that it has little impact on international affairs and limited 
influence on international conditions that affect its sovereignty and 
development. On the other hand, he also points to the common 
argument that the small scale of Norway facilitates a national 
consensus on foreign policy, and that such consensus is seen as a 
necessity for a state perceiving itself to be too small and vulnerable 
to exert substantive power in international relations.
These effects of smallness – a perceived vulnerability in 
regard to international power relations and a strong emphasis on 
consensus in foreign policy – have been central to Norwegian foreign 
policy discourse throughout its short history as a sovereign state. 
However, as a counter point to this emphasis on smallness, Riste 
also observes that Norway has at times attained a disproportionate 
position in certain areas. While Norway undeniably has a small 
population (less than five million) and a relatively small land area, 
its extensive maritime economic zone places it among the 15 largest 
countries in the world (Lunde et.al., 2008). This constitutes the 
basis for a position of power in certain economic activities such as 
petroleum, seafood and shipping industries, making Norway one 
of the richest countries in the world and an important actor in 
the international energy sector (Rottem, Hønneland et. al., 2008). 
This resource-based national wealth is also the economic basis 
for Norway’s disproportionally large international engagement in 
development aid, humanitarian assistance, peace promotion, and 
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climate change mitigation, and particularly through its relatively 
large contributions to the UN (Østerud, 2006). Thus, Norway can 
be said to be characterised by the coexistence of a stable identity 
as a small state and substantial international interests in certain 
sectors.
This identity – a small state with international interests – has 
played a key role in forming Norwegian foreign policy. Riste (2001) 
identifies three key positions in the development of Norwegian 
foreign policy – neutralism, moralism and internationalism. Each 
is shaped by the dilemmas associated with the small-state identity. 
Whereas neutralism is a defensive response to perceived impotence 
in international politics and an attempt to build an isolationist fence 
around the country’s sovereignty, internationalism is based on the 
realist recognition that participation in international alliances and 
arenas is needed in order to ensure its own security and economic 
interests. Moralism, or what Riste describes as a ‘missionary 
impulse’, can be seen as an idealist mode of internationalism 
operating outside realist security politics and seeking to overcome 
the small state’s lack of power by pursuing influence through value 
diplomacy. Riste argues that these positions can be traced back to 
three formative periods in Norway’s foreign policy. 
Neutralism emerged after Norway gained its independence in 
1905, as a strategy to safeguard both the sovereignty of the new state 
and the international economic interests of the shipping industry. 
Moralism gained a prominent position in the inter-war period when 
Norway engaged itself in idealist promotion of peace, international 
cooperation, and rule of law, reflecting both the idealist tendencies 
in international relations at the time and the domestic politics of 
religious and labour movements (Knutsen, Sørbø and Gjerdåker, 
1995; Leira, 2002). Realist internationalism achieved a dominant 
position during and after World War II, when Norway entered into 
US-led security alliances and remained a loyal partner throughout 
the Cold War. Riste (2001) observes that although different 
periods have been marked by the predominance of one of the 
three positions, Norwegian foreign policy could be described as an 
accumulation and coexistence of paradigms. While concerns with 
neutralism and self-determination have, for example, kept Norway 
outside the European Union, realist internationalism has led to 
active participation in North Atlantic security politics (Østerud, 
2005). Idealist internationalism has expressed itself as ambivalence 
towards US-led security politics and through strong commitments 
to humanitarian and development cooperation, international law, 
universal human rights, international regulation and support for 
the UN (Rottem, 2007; Tvedt, 2009). Thus, Norwegian foreign policy 
has been marked by an uneasy coexistence of realism, idealism 
and neutralism, producing policies which have been criticised for 
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being contradictory and lacking clear goals and strategies. But they 
have also accommodated different political interests within Norway 
and, thus, fostered a robust foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; 
Neumann, 2002). 
Matlary (2002) and Græger and Leira (2005) observe that 
these coexisting positions have produced a bifurcation in Norwegian 
foreign policy between security politics and value diplomacy, in 
which security interests have been given a clear priority. The relative 
weight assigned to value diplomacy varies across the left/right axis 
in Norwegian politics. While security politics has been the foremost 
concern of the political right, value diplomacy has had a stronger 
position on the left. However, this left/right division is complicated 
by the strong legacy of realist internationalism in the Labour Party 
and the emphasis on value diplomacy within the non-socialist 
Christian Democratic Party. The division and hierarchical ranking 
between interests and ideals is also reflected in the traditional 
institutional division between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Development Cooperation, with separate government 
white papers on foreign affairs and development cooperation. 
Throughout the Cold War period, security was seen as the real 
interest, with value diplomacy being portrayed as an additional 
field that was pursued due to a combination of political idealism 
and economic affluence. Matlary (2002, 2006) argues that this has 
changed after Cold War, when value diplomacy has gained new 
prominence both internationally and in Norway. The explanation 
for this is to be found in the changing character of diplomacy 
due to: the growth of international organisations, agreements, 
and regulatory regimes; increased importance of international 
law, rights, and courts; and growing public openness and debate 
on foreign policy with increased participation by NGOs, media, 
and others. These changes have increased the need for political 
legitimacy in international relations, requiring foreign policies and 
positions to be justified with reference to norms, principles, rights, 
and agreements rather than solely being based on economic and 
military command power. 
The new centrality of value diplomacy does not necessarily 
mean that foreign policies are motivated by values, only that 
diplomatic practices that emphasise ideals and utilise soft power 
have become more prominent due to the need for political legitimacy. 
Value diplomacy can therefore be instrumental for the pursuit of 
security and economic interests. Nye’s (2004) work on soft power 
is especially central to this mode of reasoning. Being concerned 
about the international standing and potential demise of the US, 
Nye argues that states may choose to use soft or hard power to 
affect the behaviour of other actors in order to achieve their own 
interests. Soft power refers to the power of persuasion as opposed 
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to command power based on economic and military resources. Soft 
power may be pursued independently from economic and military 
capabilities, but Nye argues that it is most effective if it is combined 
with hard power. He thus advocates the use of smart power, meaning 
a strategic combination of the hard power of coercion and payment 
with the soft power of attraction. Zahran and Ramos (2010) describe 
this in Gramscian terms as a hegemonic strategy in the sense 
that soft power is an instrument for normalising domination, or 
‘coercion armoured by consent’. Others see soft power as a relatively 
independent source of influence and argue that it is, in fact, most 
effective when it is delinked from economic and security interests. 
This is, for instance, the position held by Egeland (1988). He argue 
that small states like Norway, without vested interests or capability 
to deploy hard power, could be more effective in facilitating dialog 
and resolving conflicts through peaceful means. 
In this situation, where international diplomacy has shifted, 
to some extent, from military might to values and rights due to the 
growth of public diplomacy and need for political legitimacy, Norway 
has redefined its blend of idealist and realist internationalism. First, 
Norwegian security politics has undergone major changes (Lange, 
Pharo and Østerud, 2009; Matlary and Østerud, 2005). Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Norway faces no immediate threat 
to its territorial sovereignty, although there are critical concerns 
regarding the rebuilding of Russia’s military capability (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2009). Contemporary armed conflicts tend to be 
intrastate conflicts in the global South rather than the interstate 
conflicts inscribed in geopolitical rivalry between the US and the 
Soviet Union of the Cold War period. While there has been increased 
attention to global security threats from localised new wars 
(Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 1999), the Norway’s main interests relate 
to transnational economic activities (especially in oil, seafood and 
shipping industries), control and management of shared natural 
resources (especially in the North Atlantic and the Polar regions), 
and institutional arrangements for global governance including of 
security, law, and trade (Lunde et al., 2008). At the same time, it 
can be observed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
Norway’s traditional channel for security politics, now contains a 
broad diversity of member states with divergent strategic interests, 
no common existential threat and little attention to geopolitics in 
the North Atlantic and Arctic, where Norway’s territorial interests 
and leverage are located. In this context, Norway has downsized 
and re-oriented its armed forces away from territorial defence to 
participation in UN-sanctioned and NATO-organised international 
operations, although with a certain reluctance towards out-of-
area military interventions (Græger and Leira, 2005; Matlary 
and Østerud, 2005; Neumann, 2008; Rottem, 2007). Norway has 
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also explored additional Nordic and European arenas for security 
cooperation and is investing in global regulation through the UN, 
making Norwegian security contingent on a fourfold security net 
defined in terms of partly overlapping geographic territories and 
scales: Nordic, European, North Atlantic and global. 
Second, there has also been a growth and thematic shift in 
value diplomacy. Norwegian engagement politics started from a 
focus on development and poverty alleviation in the global South, 
but has seen a growing emphasis on humanitarian assistance and 
human rights promotion from the late 1980s, peace facilitation 
and peace building from the early 1990s, and climate change 
mitigation after the turn of the century (Egeland, 1988; Knutsen, 
Sørbø and Gjerdåker, 1995; Matlary, 2002; Skånland, 2008; Støre, 
2008; Østerud, 2006). This new centrality of engagement politics 
is also reflected in the institutional arrangements for development 
cooperation. The former Ministry of Development Cooperation and 
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) have 
been integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Section 
for Peace and Reconciliation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has grown in terms of responsibilities and resources. It can also 
be noted that international climate change mitigation – the latest 
addition to Norwegian engagement politics – has become an integral 
part of foreign policy, and the current Minister for Development 
Cooperation, Erik Solheim, is also the Minister for the Environment. 
Norway’s new emphasis on engagement politics, which is 
facilitated by post-Cold War opportunities in international relations 
and revolves around development, humanitarian assistance, 
human rights, peace, and environmental change, is often portrayed 
as a matter of idealism. However, engagement politics can also be 
seen as an alternative strategy to acquire influence and benefits in 
international relations in a situation in which Norway’s geostrategic 
leverage within NATO is lessened, the country remains a non-
member in the European Union, and participation in US-led out-
of-area operations is politically controversial. Norway is pursuing 
economic and security interests through diverse arenas, but the 
access, influence, and benefits from these are varied and depend on 
Norway’s international standing. This gives new centrality to value 
diplomacy. Hence, Norwegian peace engagement, having initially 
emerged from Christian and socialist idealist internationalism and 
in partial opposition to security politics, can be seen as a strategy to 
obtain recognition and influence in multiple arenas of international 
relations. It can thus be argued that ideals and interests have 
merged in the sense that ideals are included in a broadened notion 
of interests and interests are pursued through the language and 
practices of idealism (Lunde et al., 2008; Støre, 2008).
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The discursive construction of Norway’s peace engagement
The changing international context for security and value 
diplomacy is reflected in Norwegian peace engagement discourse. 
This discourse can be said to have both a short and a long 
history. Whereas Skånland (2008) points to the emergence and 
transformation of a distinct peace engagement discourse since the 
early 1990s, Leira (2002) draws attention to its deep roots in the 
focus on peace and neutrality in the early history of Norwegian 
foreign policy (ca. 1890-1940). Although there are links between 
the old and new peace discourses, these are seldom acknowledged 
except for occasional remarks about the roots of contemporary peace 
engagement in the humanitarian ‘legacy of Fridtjof Nansen’ and 
Norway’s support for the League of Nations in the interwar period 
(Leira, 2005). The main reason for this disjuncture is the hegemony 
of realism and security politics throughout the Cold War (Græger 
and Leira, 2005). As discussed above, this has changed with the 
transformation of security interests, the growth of transnational 
economic interests and the increased importance of soft power 
diplomacy in the post-Cold War period.  
Skånland (2008) identifies a distinct Norwegian peace 
engagement discourse that emerged in the aftermath of the Oslo 
Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements) in the Israel-Palestine peace process in 1993. 
The most general claim in this discourse is that Norway is an 
international peace promoter. While this discourse came to the 
forefront with the Middle East peace process, Skånland shows that 
there were important ideational precursors in the late 1980s. First, 
a book by Egeland (1988) entitled Impotent Superpower – Potent 
Small State has been influential as a conceptual foundation for 
Norway’s current engagement politics. Egeland argues that Norway 
has advantages and under-utilised potential for humanitarian 
interventions, human rights advocacy and, by implication, peace 
promotion. The basis for this claim is to be found in a set of 
preconditions, most notably: a broad political consensus on foreign 
policy; few conflicting foreign policy interests; and available funds 
for foreign assistance. Institutional capabilities are identified as 
another precondition for successful value diplomacy. Egeland found 
that this was less developed than the other preconditions at the time 
of writing, but argued that this could be changed through strategic 
interventions to build expertise and develop close ties between 
the state, NGOs and academic institutions. This line of reasoning 
was later put to practice, not the least by Egeland himself as State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the formative period of 
Norway’s contemporary peace engagement. Second, Skånland also 
observes that Government Reports on development assistance and 
foreign policy in 1987, 1989, and 1992 introduced peace as a goal 
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for development cooperation, broadened the concept of security and 
linked it to global challenges of under-development, and argued 
that Norway could play a lead role in foreign policy areas where it 
has expertise and resources (Ministry of Development Cooperation 
1987, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1989, 1992). Nevertheless, peace 
promotion was yet to be identified as an arena where Norway has 
comparative advantages and peace was generally treated as a sub-
category of humanitarian assistance and democracy promotion. 
This means that peace was emerging as an important issue, but it 
was only after the facilitation of the Israel-Palestine peace process 
that it became a nodal point in Norwegian foreign policy discourse. 
Following from the early focus on Norway as a humanitarian 
superpower, Skånland (2008) observes that the 1990s saw the 
emergence and consolidation of a Norwegian peace engagement 
discourse. Starting with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 
Norwegian media put much effort into disclosing the details of the 
Israel-Palestine peace process, relying extensively on accounts from 
official sources. The overall narrative was about the remarkable 
success and importance of Norway for the positive outcome of 
the negotiations. This representation was reaffirmed by reports of 
international praise for Norwegian peace diplomacy. The message 
was, in agreement with Egeland’s earlier argument, that a small 
state had achieved what the superpowers had failed to do, namely 
to resolve a protracted conflict with strong links to international 
politics. In explaining this success story the media emphasised a 
set of key factors, especially the close personal contacts and trust 
that the facilitators managed to build to key actors on both sides of 
the conflict as well as Norway’s neutrality and lack of self-interests. 
The point was also made that the successful facilitation would yield 
international recognition that could benefit Norwegian interests, 
but this did not alter the dominant representation of Norway as a 
neutral and altruistic peace facilitator. Finally, it was also argued 
that Norway could repeat its success, utilising the same approach of 
neutrality, trust, dialog, and facilitation in other conflict situations. 
Skånland (2008) shows that these media representations of 
Norwegian peace engagement were brought into official discourse 
through speeches by government representatives and government 
reports on development cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1995, 2004). In clear contrast to earlier reports, peace engagement 
was now a prioritised field in foreign policy. The swiftness with which 
this shift happened was remarkable. This testifies to the timeliness 
of the policy change in the context of post-Cold War international 
diplomacy, the capacity of key actors to make adjustments in 
Norway’s foreign policy and, not the least, the demonstration effect 
from the Israel-Palestine peace process. Gradually, the basis for 
peace engagement was broadened across the spectre of political 
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parties, with the right-wing Progress Party as the only exception. 
The facilitator role in the Middle East, the institutionalisation of 
the peace engagement discourse, and the changes in foreign policy 
were spearheaded by the Labour Party.3 There was some initial 
contestation from the Conservative Party, which advocated a stronger 
focus on security interests in the North Atlantic, but this opposition 
was relatively subdued and short lived. Instead, the Labour Party’s 
interest in peace promotion was furthered by the non-socialist 
coalition government (1997-2000) led by Prime Minister Kjell Magne 
Bondevik from the value-oriented Christian Democratic Party. The 
leader of the Conservative Party, Jan Petersen, who had been a 
prominent critic of the emphasis on value diplomacy, continued the 
peace engagement agenda when he held the position as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (2001-2005). Thus, it can be observed that six 
out of the seven parties that are represented in the Norwegian 
Parliament have participated in government coalitions that have 
endorsed peace promotion and value diplomacy.4 This testifies to 
the extent in which peace engagement has become an integral part 
of the foreign policy consensus since the early 1990s.
The rise of the peace engagement discourse has triggered 
debates about the motivation and results of Norwegian peace 
engagement. Regarding motivation, the early representations in 
media, official documents, and speeches emphasised international 
solidarity and humanitarianism as the basis for Norway’s peace 
engagement. This emphasis on values was challenged in the 1990s 
by the political right, which argued that idealist peace engagement 
would shift the focus away from Norway’s economic and security 
interests. The counter argument that emerged held that peace 
engagement actually benefits those interests. First, engagement 
politics was said to be beneficial due to the links between distant 
conflicts and Norwegian economic and security interests. This is the 
recognition that state and human security in the global South and 
North are increasingly interconnected in a globalised world (Duffield, 
2001; Kaldor, 1999; Støre, 2008). Second, peace engagement was 
also portrayed as a source of international recognition that could 
be utilised to promote Norwegian interests in international arenas. 
This line of reasoning was not the least deployed by the non-
socialist government led by Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik 
(1997-2000), Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk and his State 
Secretary Janne Haaland Matlary, all representing the Christian 
Democratic Party. Matlary’s argument in her roles as politician and 
academic was that value-based foreign policy gives international 
political capital that could be instrumental in pursuing economic 
and security interests, although the conversion from recognition to 
influence may vary according to issues and arenas of international 
diplomacy (Matlary, 2002). The new consensus that emerged holds 
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that Norwegian peace engagement is motivated by both idealism and 
realism, with no major conflict between them. Ideals and interests 
are thus said to go hand in hand in Norway’s contemporary foreign 
policy (Liland and Kjerland, 2003; Støre, 2008).5 
The past decade has, in particular, witnessed a discussion 
about the characteristics and effectiveness of Norway’s approach to 
peace. The dominant representation holds that Norway has specific 
advantages as a small state without a colonial history and with no 
vested interests or hard power to pressure parties into externally 
imposed peace deals. It is also argued that Norway has developed 
competence and a distinct approach to peace promotion in which 
the basic building blocks are: invited facilitation of political 
negotiations rather than interventionist peacemaking; an emphasis 
on dialog with the protagonists based on parity of status and the 
principle of third-party impartiality; instrumental, flexible, and 
long-term use of humanitarian and development aid to facilitate 
conflict resolution and peace building, and; implementation of 
humanitarian rehabilitation and development for peace building 
through partnerships between state authorities, non-governmental 
organisations and multilateral aid agencies.6 In the absence of 
military command power, the Norwegian approach relies on soft 
power, state economic resources, and network forms of governance 
to facilitate dialog between the protagonists to a conflict. Höglund 
and Svensson (2011) describe this as a peace ownership approach 
because it assigns prime responsibility to the protagonists while 
placing Norway in a role as facilitating third party with limited power, 
no immediate self-interest in the conflict, no pre-defined roadmap 
for the process, or blueprint, for the peace accord. Nevertheless, 
this approach has a structuring effect on peace processes that 
involve Norway as a facilitator. 
Failure to deliver lasting peace challenges the discursive 
construction and international standing of Norway as a peace 
promoter. The critique of Norwegian peace engagement holds that 
its idealist intentions are not matched by achievements in terms 
of lasting peace. Whereas defenders of the approach emphasise 
that Norway can only facilitate and not impose peace, critics assert 
that the failure to resolve the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and in 
Sri Lanka indicates that there are fundamental weaknesses in the 
Norwegian approach. These failures might also undermine the 
political legitimacy of Norway in international relations, making 
peace engagement a liability rather than a source of international 
political capital. Sri Lanka’s peace process provides illustrative 
evidence of the structuring effect of the Norwegian approach and an 
opportunity to examine the effectiveness of this soft power strategy 
to conflict resolution.
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Sri Lanka as a test for the Norwegian approach
The past decade witnessed the emergence of Sri Lanka as 
a test for ending conflict by political or military means, and for 
international engagement in relation to both modes of conflict 
resolution. The last attempt at negotiating an end to the protracted 
conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was characterised by 
active involvement by a range of international actors as facilitators, 
donors, and monitors of liberal peace, with Norway as a prominent 
actor in all three roles. From being an intrastate conflict that was 
of little relevance beyond the South Asian sub-continent, Sri Lanka 
became a test for the Norwegian soft power approach to peace 
facilitation and also, more broadly, for liberal peace building by 
the US-led ‘international community’ (Goodhand and Klem, 2005; 
Liyanage, 2008; Lunstead, 2007; Stokke and Uyangoda, 2011). 
Sri Lanka was for 26 years – from July 1983 to May 2009 – 
marked by a protracted intrastate conflict between the Sinhalese-
dominated ethnocratic state and a militant Tamil nationalist 
movement demanding self-determination for the Tamil nation and 
homeland (Tamil Eelam) in north-east Sri Lanka. Tamil nationalism 
originated in the institutionalisation of ethnic identities and division 
of labour under British colonial rule and the demands for communal 
political representation in the transition to independence. It took 
the form of a non-violent and democratic movement for federalism 
after independence in 1948, but was radicalised in the 1970s 
through a separatist movement which, from the 1980s, came to 
be dominated by militant organisations (Balasingham, 2004; 
Manogaran and Pfaffenberger, 1994; Wilson, 2000). This militant 
separatist movement consisted initially of five major organisations, 
but internal clashes in the late 1980s left LTTE in a dominant 
position and claiming to be the ‘sole representative’ of the Tamil 
nation (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 1994; Swamy, 1994).7 
Sri Lanka’s intrastate conflict was interspersed by five 
attempts at political conflict resolution: the Thimpu Talks between 
the GOSL and the major separatist organisations in 1985; the 
Indo-Lanka Accord between the GOSL and the Government of 
India in 1987; the informal talks between President Premadasa’s 
government and LTTE in 1989-1990; the negotiations between the 
government of President Kumaratunga and LTTE in 1994-1995, 
and; the peace process between Prime Minister Wickremasinghe’s 
government and LTTE in 2002-2003 (Balasingham, 2004; 
Gooneratne, 2007; Rupesinghe, 2006; Uyangoda, 2005; Uyangoda 
and Perera, 2003). Compared to the first four attempts at negotiated 
conflict resolution, the last peace process was characterised by 
an extensive internationalisation of the conflict. India had played 
a key role in the peace processes in the 1980s, motivated by its 
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geopolitical interests in the sub-continent and the complex links 
between Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka and domestic politics 
in India. However, the India refrained from open engagement in 
the conflict after the failures of the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 
Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in the late 1980s (Muni, 1993). 
Hence, the Sri Lankan conflict remained a domestic affair largely 
delinked from international security and development politics 
(Lunstead, 2007). The last peace process, however, marked a 
significant change in this respect. Sri Lanka’s main aid donors put 
pressure on the government to seek a political settlement in the 
late 1990s, when the GOSL suffered military setbacks and faced 
a severe development crisis. The donors made aid an instrument 
for peace after the electoral victory of the market-friendly United 
National Front (UNF) in 2001 and the signing of a ceasefire 
agreement between GOSL and LTTE in 2002. Funding for peace 
building was provided or pledged by various donors, especially 
the co-chairs to the donor conferences (Japan, European Union, 
the US and Norway). A broad range of international development 
organisations, including the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and international NGOs, were involved in humanitarian and 
development programs, especially after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. It can, therefore, be observed that the question of peace in 
Sri Lanka became thoroughly internationalised from the late 1990s 
and that this happened largely through development cooperation 
(Bastian, 2005, 2007; Burke and Mulakala, 2005; Goodhand and 
Klem, 2005; Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2008; Sriskandarajah, 
2003).
This internationalisation of peace by way of development 
cooperation reflects the changing international discourse on the 
links between development and peace. During the Cold War, 
international aid was to a large extent subsumed under the 
global rivalry between US-dominated capitalism and Soviet-led 
socialism. Concerns about human rights and democracy were thus 
downplayed by donors. This changed from the late 1980s when 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumphalism of western 
liberalism provided a space for liberal concerns about the efficiency, 
transparency, and accountability of developmental states. In 
countries with intrastate conflicts, this shift to good governance 
also brought new attention to the links between development 
and peace. In the 1990s, it was increasingly recognised that 
conflicts pose obstacles to successful development, but also that 
development could be an instrument for crafting peace (Jarstad 
and Sisk, 2008; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2007). Following from 
this, development cooperation has undergone a general shift from 
being conflict blind – in the sense that development aid was offered 
without taking conflicts into consideration – to offering aid in a 
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conflict-sensitive manner. This shift also increasingly witnessed 
the use of development assistance as a tool for transforming 
conflicts and building liberal peace (Anderson, 1999; Goodhand, 
2006). As multilateral aid organisations and donor states became 
concerned with conflict transformation, political reforms towards 
peace were added as a precondition for development assistance to 
countries with intrastate conflicts. Hard power, in the form of aid 
conditionality, has, therefore, been combined with the soft power of 
facilitating peace negotiations (Boyce, 2002).
The Sri Lankan conflict in the late 1990s was conducive 
for this kind of peace promotion. Sri Lanka was characterised 
by a protracted intrastate conflict that had reached a mutually 
hurting stalemate and produced a humanitarian and development 
crisis that made both the GOSL and the LTTE willing to sign the 
ceasefire agreement, enter into political negotiations, and address 
humanitarian and developmental needs. At the same time, Sri 
Lanka’s international aid donors were committed to making 
Sri Lanka a showcase for liberal peace building and found like-
minded partners in the UNP-led government and, to some extent, 
in the network around LTTE’s chief negotiator Anton Balasingham 
(Lunstead, 2007). The Norwegian approach to peace was an 
acceptable framework to the protagonists while there were no 
other candidates for the facilitator role that were deemed to be 
both qualified and politically acceptable.8 Thus, domestic and 
international stakeholders converged around Norway as a capable 
and impartial facilitator, and the country’s approach to peace based 
on soft power facilitation supported by aid-funded peace building. 
Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka originated from 
the long-standing development cooperation between the two states. 
Norway-Sri Lanka development cooperation dates back to NGO 
projects in the late 1960s and bilateral development assistance from 
the mid 1970s. As Sri Lanka became a middle-income country in the 
1990s, Norwegian assistance was increasingly orientated towards 
peace and reconciliation. Networks, knowledge and trust that 
originated in development cooperation formed the basis for informal 
communication between Norway and the protagonists from 1997 to 
1999. An agreement was made between the two governments that 
Norwegian development assistance should support a negotiated 
solution to the conflict. Following from these precursors, the 
period from 1999-2002 was marked by the formal invitation and 
mandate from the GOSL and LTTE to Norway to facilitate peace 
negotiations and the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2002. 
A Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established by the 
Nordic countries to record and coordinate inquiries into ceasefire-
agreement violations and to support local dispute resolution, 
although without power to rule on violations or enforce compliance 
with the ceasefire agreement. 
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The period from 2002-2006 was characterised by Norwegian 
support for capacity building among the protagonists to participate 
in peace negotiations and six rounds of GOSL-LTTE negotiations 
in 2002-2003. Negotiations focused primarily on immediate 
humanitarian and security issues, but also yielded a shared 
willingness to explore a federal solution to the conflict. After 
the negotiations stalled in 2003, Norway took various initiatives 
to restart the stalled peace process – including negotiations to 
establish a joint mechanism for handling humanitarian assistance 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (McGilvray and Gamburd, 
2010). The final period of the GOSL-LTTE conflict, from 2006-2009, 
was marked by the gradual resumption of armed hostilities and 
return to full-scale war. Norway’s role in Sri Lanka became heavily 
politicised and public confidence in the facilitator and the peace 
process plunged. Despite this, the GOSL and the LTTE upheld the 
formal mandate for Norway as a peace facilitator even after the 
abrogation of the ceasefire agreement by the GOSL in 2008 (Peiris 
and Stokke, 2011).
This brief account shows that Norway has, since the late 
1990s, sought to facilitate peace in Sri Lanka through the soft 
power of dialog combined with aid-funded peace building. This 
facilitator role was backed by the US-led international community 
and, especially, the co-chairs to Sri Lanka’s aid donor conferences. 
As the peace negotiations stalled, the donors gradually turned to 
a more hard power strategy whereby aid became conditional on 
progress towards peace. Assessing Norwegian and international 
peace engagement in Sri Lanka hence requires close attention to 
the strength and weaknesses of soft power facilitation in the face 
of domestic political dynamics and the use of aid as a hard power 
strategy to restart the stalled peace negotiations.
The soft power of facilitation and the politics of state reforms
Norway’s role in Sri Lanka’s peace process exemplifies the 
Norwegian approach to peace engagement. Höglund and Svensson 
(2011) observe that the principle of peace ownership permeated 
the process and determined its key characteristics, including 
who participated at the negotiation table and which issues were 
brought up for discussion. Most importantly, the principle of peace 
ownership placed the responsibility for peace in the hands of 
GOSL and LTTE, who were defined as the principal parties to the 
conflict and taken to represent the broader Sinhalese and Tamil 
communities. The role of Norway was based on invitation, mandate 
and continued consent from the GOSL and LTTE and was limited 
to organising communication and negotiations between them. The 
peace ownership approach, therefore, made the dynamics and 
outcome of the peace process highly dependent on the positions 
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and strategies of the protagonists. Since the GOSL and LTTE’s 
claims to political legitimacy were highly contested, the peace 
process was also vulnerable to oppositional politicisation on both 
sides of the ethnic divide. This means that the role of the facilitator 
was circumscribed by two key conditions: (1) the frozen balance 
of military power and continued ‘war by other means’ between the 
GOSL and LTTE, and; (2) the entrenched institutional and political 
obstacles to substantive conflict resolution (Stokke, 2011). 
First, the peace process was defined by the militarisation of 
the ethnic conflict and the military balance of power between the 
GOSL and the LTTE. By the 1990s, the broad diversity of actors 
and positions within Tamil nationalism had come to be dominated 
by the military capabilities and strategies of the LTTE. At the same 
time, the government, led by President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, turned to an all-out ‘war for peace’ strategy after the 
failed peace negotiations in 1994-1995. However, the war between 
LTTE and GOSL reached a mutually hurting stalemate in the late 
1990s following a series of military advances by the LTTE that 
brought extensive areas under their control and created a degree of 
parity with the GOSL. This power balance brought the protagonists 
to the negotiation table and kept them from resuming warfare 
despite the breakdown of the negotiation process, until the balance 
was altered by uneven military capacity building between the two 
sides and the changing positions among the international actors in 
favour of the GOSL. The ceasefire agreement on February 22, 2002, 
froze this military balance of power, segmented a de facto dual-state 
structure and institutionalised LTTE and GOSL as the principal 
parties to the peace process. These constellations were the basis 
for narrowly defined ‘track-one’ negotiations focusing primarily 
on security issues and humanitarian rehabilitation (Uyangoda 
and Perera, 2003). Other stakeholders were not included in the 
formal negotiations and there was no additional process aimed at 
building a political consensus on peace. The political opposition, 
including the Sri Lankan Freedom Party and the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP), the Muslim minority, non-LTTE Tamil actors, 
and the broad diversity of civil society organisations including the 
Buddhist Sangha, were all excluded from the peace process. Peace 
ownership was thus narrowly confined to LTTE and GOSL, based 
on their military standing in the war and the assumption that they 
represented the key interests and could negotiate peace for their 
respective constituencies.
 Second, the dynamics and outcome of the peace process 
were over-determined by domestic political dynamics. Sri Lanka’s 
intrastate conflict was politically produced, and post-independence 
politics have created entrenched institutional and political obstacles 
to substantive conflict resolution. The key conflict-producing 
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mechanisms were to be found in the way post-colonial liberal 
democracy fostered ethno-nationalist mobilisation and outbidding, 
yielding a certain political inclusion of subordinate classes 
but also Sinhalese majoritarianism, Tamil minority resistance, 
and constitutional and institutional reforms that furthered 
majoritarianism (Coomeraswamy, 2003; De Votta, 2004; Stokke, 
2011). Uyangoda (2011), therefore, argues that the Sri Lankan 
state has gained an ethnocratic character that makes state reforms 
towards accommodating minority grievances exceedingly difficult. 
Whereas the ethnic mass base of the state undermines pressure 
from below for state reforms, elite negotiations for peace always 
run the risk of opportunistic counter-mobilisation. The outcome is 
an ethnocracy that is conflict producing and with little ability for 
democratic self-renewal.
Against this background, the peace process was an attempt 
at elitist crafting of peace amidst entrenched institutional and 
political obstacles to substantial conflict resolution (Philipson and 
Thangarajah, 2005; Rampton and Welikala, 2005). The UNP-led 
government had been brought to power on a political platform that 
promised peace and development and viewed negotiated peace 
as a prerequisite for their primary goal of furthering market-led 
development (Bastian, 2005, 2007). However, the government was 
based on a weak coalition with a small majority in parliament and 
faced a fragmented political elite and lack of political consensus 
on peace. This was especially evident in the contentious co-
habitation between the UNP-led government of Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremasinghe and the powerful executive President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga from the opposition Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party. The government was also challenged by a 
broader Sinhalese opposition and its strategies of ethno-nationalist 
counter-mobilisation and ethnic outbidding. 
These political obstacles to peace produced a process that 
was narrowly defined in terms of the issues that were discussed 
(Ferdinands et al., 2004). The negotiations were confined to the 
content and implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the 
immediate humanitarian needs of war-affected peoples and areas, 
while the core issues of state reforms towards minority rights, 
devolution of power, and substantive political representation 
gained much less attention. In this situation, the GOSL and LTTE 
sought to pursue their interests and institutionalise their preferred 
solution as the peace process evolved around other questions than 
these core issues. The GOSL pursued a strategy of normalising 
everyday life by way of cessation of hostilities and aid-funded 
livelihood reconstruction under the assumption that this would 
depoliticise Tamil grievances and reduce the need for contentious 
state reforms (Orjuela, 2011). The anticipated peace dividend 
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and international aid were also expected to deliver development 
and political legitimacy for the government within the Sinhalese 
majority. The LTTE followed a strategy of institutionalising power 
sharing by building separate state institutions within areas under 
its control and thereby produce a pretext for internal or external 
self-determination based on earned sovereignty (Nadarajah and 
Vimalarajah, 2008; Stokke, 2006, 2007). In this sense, both 
protagonists used the ‘no war/no peace’ situation that was created 
by the ceasefire agreement to pursue their strategic interests, 
making the peace process an extension of war by other means. This 
entrenched a de facto dual-state structure, with parallel but very 
different needs for political transformations within two political 
entities. On one hand, there was the Sri Lankan state which could 
be seen as a consolidated electoral democracy characterised by 
majoritarianism within a unitary and centralised constitution, and 
various kinds of illiberal political practices (de Votta, 2004). On the 
other, there was the state-building project within LTTE-controlled 
areas where LTTE demonstrated an ability to govern but doing so 
by way of authoritarian centralisation with no mechanisms for 
democratic representation. These democracy deficits pointed to the 
need for comprehensive political transformations, but this turned 
out to be too complicated and contentious to be handled in the peace 
process (Uyangoda, 2005; Uyangoda and Gomez, 2007). Instead, 
the talks on state reforms were confined to the question of power 
sharing between these two units. A noteworthy achievement came 
in the form of an agreement in 2003 to explore a federal model for 
Sri Lanka based on the concept of ‘internal self-determination’ for 
the Tamils in the north-east (Balasingham, 2004). This indicated 
that the LTTE was prepared to give up the demand for secession 
(‘external self-determination’) and that the GOSL was willing to 
consider constitutional reforms to accommodate devolution and 
power sharing. However, the negotiations reached a stalemate in 
2003 over the question of interim administration for the north-east, 
demonstrating the political vulnerability of the peace process. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the Norwegian peace 
ownership approach made the peace process highly contingent on 
domestic political constellations. The peace process was especially 
shaped by the military balance of power between LTTE and GOSL 
and the political fragmentation and ethnic outbidding within 
Sinhalese majority politics. These constellations produced a peace 
process that was narrowly defined both in terms of stakeholders and 
issues, producing excluded actors and issues that were politicised 
when the political space for oppositional mobilisation widened. 
Given the emphasis on peace ownership and soft-power facilitation 
within the Norwegian approach, it can also be observed that the 
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facilitators gave themselves little leverage to ensure inclusivity and 
substantive progress on core issues amidst entrenched institutional 
and political constraints.
The hard power of aid and the politicisation of development
The Norwegian peace ownership approach placed the 
responsibility for peace in the hands of the LTTE and GOSL in a 
context where there were entrenched institutional and political 
obstacles to addressing the core political issues. The pragmatic 
strategy for peace that emerged from these constellations was one 
of postponing and depoliticising rather than resolving the core 
issues of state reforms for power sharing, minority rights, and 
substantive democratic representation. The main component in this 
depoliticisation strategy consisted of humanitarian rehabilitation 
in war-affected areas and normalisation of market-led development 
throughout the island.
The use of development as a precursor to conflict resolution 
came out of the crisis of development facing the GOSL and LTTE 
and international actors at the beginning of the peace process 
(Kelegama, 2006; Bastian, 2007). The government, on the one 
hand, was grappling with economic stagnation, soaring military 
expenses, and rising costs of living that threatened their political 
legitimacy and electoral survival. The LTTE, on the other hand, 
faced a humanitarian crisis and a war-weary Tamil population 
who had suffered massive losses of lives and livelihoods. This 
situation made development a point of convergence for the warring 
parties and international actors as it allowed them to pursue their 
interests through the peace process. ‘Peace through development’ 
was certainly acceptable to the UNF government, which had a 
primary focus on neo-liberal economic development and sought to 
capitalise on the assumed peace dividend from reduced military 
expenses and international aid for post-conflict peace building 
(Bastian, 2007; Orjuela, 2011; Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 
2008). It was also agreeable to the LTTE, which held the position 
that immediate humanitarian issues should be addressed first, but 
with the explicit understanding that this would only be the first 
step toward resolution of the core political issues (Balasingham, 
2004). For the international actors, the aim was both to promote 
the UNF government’s market-friendly development model and to 
make Sri Lanka a success story of liberal peace building (Bastian, 
2007; Kelegama, 2006; Lunstead, 2007). 
Rainford and Satkunanathan (2011) and Shanmugaratnam 
and Stokke (2008) observe that this primacy of peace building 
made development administration a main point of contention 
between the GOSL and LTTE, as well as a rallying point for the 
Sinhalese opposition. LTTE viewed an interim administration with 
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a fair degree of autonomy and a guaranteed position for the LTTE as 
an absolute necessity to ensure the fulfillment of both short-term 
development needs and long-term demands for self-determination. 
The GOSL, and especially the Sinhalese opposition, feared that an 
interim administration in the north-east with LTTE in a dominant 
position would constitute a first step towards secession and hence 
a substantive threat to the sovereignty of the unitary state. In this 
situation, the GOSL only proposed minimalist institutional reforms 
within the framework of the existing constitution. These proposals 
were rejected by the LTTE on grounds that they were too limited in 
scope and failed to provide for substantive participation of the LTTE 
in decision making and delivery of rehabilitation and development 
in the north-east (Balasingham, 2004). LTTE’s counter proposal 
for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) was, however, 
unacceptable to the GOSL and the Sinhalese opposition because 
it gave far-reaching powers to the LTTE in the north-east. These 
disagreements between the protagonists over interim development 
administration brought the negotiations to a stalemate and, 
thereby, produced a widening of the political space for the political 
opposition to mobilise against the peace process. It also produced 
a pretext for the president to use her constitutional powers to take 
control of three key ministries, thereby undermining the government 
and peace process. 
In this context, where the negotiations had reached a 
stalemate and there was mounting opposition against the peace 
process and the government, the role of the international actors 
– and especially Norway – was deeply politicised. The shift from 
progress to stalemate in the negotiations was followed by a shift 
in the public opinion from support for political negotiations and 
Norwegian facilitation to growing distrust and critique of the 
willingness and capability of GOSL, LTTE and Norway to resolve 
the conflict through peaceful means (Peiris and Stokke, 2011). At 
the same time, a shift in aid policy among the donors from carrot 
to stick through the use of aid conditionalities deepened tensions 
among the donors and between the donors and domestic political 
actors. These dynamics yielded a growing oppositional mobilisation 
around the questions of interim administration in the north-east 
and the donors’ aid conditionalities. The discursive nodal point in 
both cases was the quintessential question of Sri Lanka’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.
Norway and the other co-chairs tried to convince the LTTE 
and the GOSL to restart negotiations after they stalled in 2003. 
In this they relied, first and foremost, on the soft power of dialog 
supported by joint statements calling on the protagonists to return 
to the negotiation table and adhere to the terms of the ceasefire 
agreement. As this strategy failed to break the stalemate, soft-
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power diplomacy was increasingly supplemented by hard power in 
the sense that aid became conditional on progress towards peace. 
Most notably, the donor states and international organisations 
that attended the Tokyo donor meeting in June 2003 pledged an 
estimated amount of US$4.5 billion for the four year period from 
2003 to 2006, but explicitly tied this support to a call for progress in 
the peace process. Thus, the Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction 
and Development of Sri Lanka (June 10, 2003) stated more explicitly 
than what had been done earlier that the donors would monitor the 
progress towards a set of objectives and milestones:
The international community intends to review and monitor 
the progress of the peace process closely, with particular 
reference to objectives and milestones including:
a) Full compliance with the cease-fire agreement by both 
parties.
b) Effective delivery mechanisms relating to development 
activity in the North and East.
c) Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the 
declaration of the fourth session of peace talks in Thailand
d) Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based 
on the principles of the Oslo Declaration.
e) Solutions for those displaced due to the armed conflict. 
f) Effective promotion and protection of the human rights of 
all people.
g) Effective inclusion of gender equity and equality in 
the peace building, the conflict transformation and 
the reconstruction process, emphasizing an equitable 
representation of women in political fora and at other 
decision-making levels.
h) Implementation of effective measures in accordance with 
the UNICEF-supported Action Plan to stop underage 
recruitment and to facilitate the release of underage 
recruits and their rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society.
i) Rehabilitation of former combatants and civilians in the 
North and East, who have been disabled physically or 
psychologically due to the armed conflict.
j) Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
on a phased, balanced, and verifiable de-escalation, de-
militarization and normalization process at an appropriate 
time in the context of arriving at a political settlement.9
The donor conference in Tokyo marked a shift in aid policy 
in the sense that the donors went from using promises of aid as a 
positive incentive to posing the prospect of reduced support in order 
to gain leverage and bring the protagonists back to negotiations. 
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However, this shift from carrot to stick turned out to be ineffective 
as it failed to restart the stalled peace process while unavoidably 
politicising the role of the international actors. Several factors may 
explain the failure of the peace conditionality, including the flawed 
implementation by the donors due to their divergent positions on the 
Sri Lankan conflict and on the use of aid conditionalities. Different 
interpretations and ambivalence towards the peace conditionality 
among the donors meant that the protagonists could assume that 
aid would in any case be forthcoming, thereby reducing the cost of 
no-compliance. Furthermore, the fact that the conditionalities were 
imposed rather than negotiated with the protagonists may have 
reduced their willingness to comply. Mounting opposition from 
Sinhalese nationalists to the internationalisation of peace, which 
was portrayed as a neo-imperialist infringement of Sri Lanka’s 
sovereignty, also meant that adherence with the peace conditionality 
would come at a high political cost for the GOSL (Goodhand and 
Klem, 2005; Kelegama, 2006; Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2008). 
In fact it seems safe to conclude that the political cost of complying 
with the peace conditionality would have been higher than the cost 
of reduced international aid. 
These experiences were largely repeated after the 2004 
tsunami disaster. Based on the recognition that there were severe 
institutional and political obstacles to efficient and fair distribution 
of humanitarian assistance, the international actors urged that 
a joint mechanism should be established between the GOSL and 
the LTTE. Norway facilitated a negotiated agreement to establish 
a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), 
but its implementation was paralysed by Sinhalese oppositional 
mobilization which culminated in a Supreme Court ruling that 
put P-TOMS on hold on the basis that it could be against the 
constitution of the unitary state (McGilvray and Gamburd, 2010). 
Thus, the opportunity created by the tsunami for implementing 
a joint mechanism for interim development administration and 
possibly revitalising the peace process was missed. 
The Sri Lankan peace process was, therefore, characterised 
by the use of development as a precursor to peace, but also 
showed the inherent limitations of this pragmatic strategy. While 
technocratic collaboration around immediate humanitarian needs 
was an important trust-building measure, it could not substitute 
for political conflict resolution. Instead, this strategy politicised 
development and, especially, the question of interim development 
administration in the north-east. The subsequent attempt to use aid 
as a hard-power tool to restart the stalled peace negotiations further 
politicised development cooperation and the role of international 
actors, especially Norwegian facilitation. Peiris and Stokke (2011) 
observe that public support for Norwegian facilitation collapsed 
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within both the majority and the minority in the period from 2003- 
2005 because negotiations failed to bring peace and the role of 
Norway became increasingly politicised. The strong public support 
that Norway enjoyed in 2002-2003 shattered as the peace process 
stalled and the growing number of ceasefire-agreement violations 
demonstrated the weaknesses of the SLMM. Both the GOSL 
and the LTTE criticised foreign monitors for their ineffectiveness 
and partiality in favour of the other party, while the Sinhalese 
opposition politicised the role of the donors as neo-imperialism. It 
was becoming increasingly clear to political actors and the general 
public that the combination of Norwegian facilitation and domestic 
military/political constellations had produced a deadlocked ‘no 
war/no peace’ situation rather than positive peace. The attempts by 
donors to break this deadlock through the hard power of payment 
politicised development cooperation but failed to restart the peace 
negotiations. While the protagonists were preparing for resumption 
of war, the international actors came to the realisation that ‘money 
could not buy peace in Sri Lanka’.10
The impotence of soft power in the context of ‘war on terror’
Whereas the peace process represented an internationalisation 
of peace in Sri Lanka that made the Norwegian mode of peace 
engagement timely and adept, the resumption of warfare and the 
way it was framed as a ‘war on terror’ rendered the Norwegian 
soft power approach impotent and irrelevant. The GOSL’s military 
campaign against LTTE was enabled by changing international 
relations, especially the US-led war on terror and the growth of Asian 
powers, resulting in a strong emphasis on state sovereignty and 
security. This granted international legitimacy and assistance for 
the state actor and its use of military means against an insurgency 
organisation labelled as terrorists.
The context for internationalisation of peace in Sri Lanka 
was shaped by the US-led liberal world order after the end of the 
Cold War, the associated belief in liberal peace through the global 
spread of liberal democracy and neo-liberalism, and the liberal 
internationalism and support for elite-negotiated transitions to 
peace and democracy during the US presidency of Bill Clinton 
(1993-2001). Norway’s soft-power approach to peace engagement 
was well adapted to this context of western liberal internationalism, 
and Sri Lanka was viewed as a potential showcase for liberal 
peace building after the election of the market-friendly UNP-led 
government (Lunstead, 2007). However, the assumption that it 
would be possible to craft peace through internationally facilitated 
elite negotiations and aid-funded peace building, were complicated 
and undermined by the contextual politics of state and market 
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reforms, as outlined above (Bastian, 2007; Shanmugaratnam, 
2008; Stokke, 2009; Stokke and Uyangoda, 2011). When the peace 
negotiations between the GOSL and the LTTE (2002-2003) stalled 
and soft-power facilitation and aid conditionalities failed to break 
the stalemate, both the GOSL and the LTTE turned to the possibility 
and necessity of resolving the conflict by military means. The regime 
change in 2005 to the SLFP-led government of President Mahinda 
Rajapakse marked the change from a liberal peace agenda to an 
offensive ‘war against terrorism’, while the assassination of Sri 
Lanka’s Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in 2005 was seen 
as a sign of LTTE’s return to military means. Thus, the ‘no war/no 
peace’ situation that existed in 2004-2006 was replaced by renewed 
warfare from 2007 and a final military victory for the GOSL in 
2009. This military success was enabled by changing international 
relations that widened the political space for the GOSL to build 
both their political legitimacy and military capability. 
First, it can be observed that the US-initiated ‘war on terror’ 
provided a legitimising framework for labelling, proscribing, and 
attacking the LTTE as a ‘terrorist’ organisation (Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005). Prior to the Al Qaida attack in New York 
City on September 11, 2001, intrastate conflicts at the periphery 
of the world order were generally not construed as international 
security problems. After 9/11, intrastate conflicts were increasingly 
framed as global security threats due to the possibility of spillover 
effects through international migration, criminal networks and 
transnational terrorism (Kaldor, 1999). This representation 
provides legitimacy to military strategies to combat terrorism, 
protect state security and impose political order. Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah (2005) observe that the strategy of labelling LTTE as 
a terrorist organisation has been applied by the GOSL since the late 
1970s. This did not necessarily limit the LTTE’s military capability 
but it certainly undermined LTTEs international legitimacy and 
proclaimed political project of national liberation. At the same time, 
the authors observe that the politics of naming the LTTE as an 
terrorist organisation had a legitimising and mobilising effect for 
the GOSL in domestic politics and internationally: 
Deploying the rhetoric of terrorism had three distinct 
benefits for the Sri Lankan state: it de-legitimised (Tamil) 
agitation for political independence (with which terrorism 
has been conflated) thereby enabling the ‘securitisation’ 
of the issue; it mobilised Sinhala sympathy for the 
regime and its actions; and, international criticism of 
rights notwithstanding, accomplished the same abroad 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005: 91).
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The success of this strategy is reflected by the fact that LTTE 
has been designated as a terrorist organisation by a number of 
states (including the US, UK, India, Australia and Canada) due 
to its armed tactics more than it posing a security threat to their 
national interests. Such terror listing of LTTE did not prevent 
internationally facilitated peace negotiations with LTTE as the 
principal representative of Tamil minority grievances or the 
establishment of diplomatic relations and development cooperation 
with the organisation during the peace process. However, this 
interaction remained conditional on the Sri Lankan state’s 
approval. When the GOSL intensified its discursive and military 
campaign against LTTE from 2005 onwards, the organisation was 
increasingly handled as a terrorist organisation by the international 
actors. This framing could be justified with reference to ceasefire-
agreement violations and continued child recruitment by the LTTE, 
as well as assassinations of Tamil and Sinhalese adversaries. This 
situation left Norway in a precarious position with little leverage 
among the co-chairs and vis-a-vis the GOSL to promote and pursue 
its political approach to conflict resolution. Norway refrained from 
labelling or proscribing LTTE as a terrorist organisation as this 
would violate the impartiality of the facilitator role, but this allowed 
Sinhalese nationalist to label Norway as pro-LTTE and thereby 
make it increasingly difficult for Norway to play a facilitating role 
and, in particular, exert influence on the GOSL.
 Second, changing international relations towards a 
multipolar world order and the emergence of ‘new’ Asian powers 
(especially China and India) with economic and geopolitical interests 
in the Indian Ocean, and an emphasis on state sovereignty and 
security, created new opportunities for the GOSL to develop its 
military capability and successfully pursue a war against the LTTE 
(Centre for Just Peace and Democracy, 2008; Kaplan, 2009). This 
can be seen as a skilful playing of three geopolitical powers in the 
region (US, Indian and China) and associated allies (for example, 
Iran, Pakistan and Israel) to acquire military hardware, training and 
intelligence, while simultaneously defusing international demands 
for resumed negotiations and protection of human rights in the 
context of war. It can also be argued that although these geopolitical 
stakeholders are strategic competitors in the Indian Ocean, they 
share a common concern with state sovereignty and security in the 
face of insurgency movements (Sharma, 2009). Thus, the complex 
dynamics of strategic competition and converging interests between 
the US, India, and China provided a space for GOSL to conduct its 
war against LTTE. Other powers, such as Japan and the European 
Union, refrained from playing a geopolitical role. However, they 
continued to offer development assistance to the Sri Lankan state 
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while treating LTTE as an illegitimate non-state actor and, therefore, 
granting de facto support and legitimacy for the GOSL. Occasional 
joint statements from the co-chairs encouraging the protagonists to 
return to negotiations and respect human rights and international 
law did little to alter the overall pattern of international support and 
legitimacy for the war against LTTE. Most importantly, this meant 
that the relative parity of status that had existed between GOSL 
and LTTE during the peace process was replaced by asymmetry in 
the international actors, who then were dealing with the GOSL and 
LTTE as state and non-state actors. The international community 
generally came to accept the deployment of force by a sovereign 
state against an internationally banned terrorist organisation and 
refrained from taking strong action against the GOSL on questions 
of human rights and international law. Thus, the conflict was 
discursively reframed from being a conflict over minority rights 
and self-determination that should be resolved through politically 
negotiated liberal peace, to become a war against terrorism in 
which defeating LTTE became a prerequisite for state security, rule 
of law, and peace. In this situation, Norway’s soft-power approach 
was rendered irrelevant and impotent by the military strategies of 
the warring parties and the dwindling domestic and international 
support for political conflict resolution. Norway’s earlier insistence 
on parity of status between the two protagonists in the peace 
process was now replaced by the view that treating LTTE on par 
with GOSL had been a biased practice that shifted power in favour 
of the non-state actor. 
In this situation, where the facilitator role was formally 
continued although the parties were engaged in all-out war, Norway 
focused on maintaining communication with the protagonists, the 
co-chairs, and India. The facilitator role prevented Norway from 
exerting substantive pressure on the protagonists despite the harsh 
realities of the final stage of the war. The co-chairs, which held 
different views on the conflict, issued occasional joint statements 
that called on the protagonists to respect international law and 
return to political negotiations. But they also came to adopt the 
position that Sri Lanka, as a sovereign state, had a right to protect 
its security in the face of armed insurgency. Thus, Norway returned 
to the role of humanitarian aid donor, claiming to operate according 
to principles of neutrality and impartiality. In the post-war period 
since May 2009, Norway has, in a similar manner, combined 
realist recognition of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty with critical attention 
to humanitarian needs, insisting that good diplomatic relations 
between Norway and Sri Lanka are crucial to gain access and 
deliver humanitarian assistance to war-affected people and areas. 
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Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to examine the discursive 
construction of peace engagement in Norwegian foreign policy and 
to examine the characteristics and effectiveness of the Norwegian 
approach to peace. The article has argued that Norwegian peace 
engagement has emerged in the post-Cold War period as a response 
to Norway’s desire and potential to pursue both values and interests 
in international relations. US-centred international relations after 
the Cold War have provided an opportunity for merging interest 
politics and value diplomacy through multifaceted engagement 
politics. Norway’s engagement in intrastate conflicts, such as 
the one in Sri Lanka, must be understood within this framework 
rather than be explained with reference to immediate Norwegian 
interests in conflict-affected areas. The article has also argued that 
it is possible to identify a distinct Norwegian peace engagement 
approach revolving around soft-power facilitation supported by 
aid-funded peace building and network governance among like-
minded actors. The Sri Lankan case illustrates that the Norwegian 
approach does affect the character, dynamics, and outcomes of 
Norwegian-facilitated peace processes, but it also shows that it is 
not only Norway but the US-led international community that is 
being put to test. 
The Sri Lankan peace process draws critical attention to the 
question of effectiveness: Can Norway’s peace engagement deliver 
lasting peace and does it serve Norwegian interests internationally? 
First, regarding the question of whether the Norwegian approach 
works, it can be observed that the Sri Lankan peace process 
brought out inherent limitations in the Norwegian approach. On 
the one hand, it can be noted that soft-power facilitation and peace 
ownership made the dynamics and outcome of the peace process 
vulnerable to the positions and strategies of the protagonists and 
the institutional and political obstacles to substantive conflict 
resolution. The attempt to use development as a tool for depoliticising 
the conflict and as a source of hard power politicised development 
and the role of the donors without achieving the desired outcomes. 
Furthermore, the final phase of the conflict demonstrated the 
impotence and irrelevance of soft-power facilitation in the context 
of the domestic and international ‘war on terror’. The required 
impartiality of the facilitator role and the changing international 
relations in favour of GOSL and state security prevented Norway 
from exerting substantive influence on the basis of international 
conventions and laws regarding human rights and conduct of war.
 Second, regarding the question of whether peace engagement 
serves Norwegian interests internationally, it can be argued that 
failed peace processes like the one in Sri Lanka challenge the 
international standing of Norwegian peace engagement. However, 
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it does not automatically translate into loss of political capital. The 
accumulation or loss of political capital from peace engagement 
also depends on how the conduct of Norwegian peace diplomacy is 
understood and how failures are explained. Furthermore, the extent 
and manner in which recognition is translated into international 
influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another 
and between different arenas of international relations. This means 
that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct 
benefits from peace engagement.11
Finally, the Sri Lankan peace process also raises critical 
questions about the kind of peace that is sought and the political 
forces and dynamics that can drive the process towards desired 
outcomes. The international actors that were involved in the Sri 
Lankan process did not spell out their conception of peace but 
nevertheless pursued a liberal peace agenda. Towards this end, 
they relied on the political mandate and capability of the UNP-led 
government to deliver sufficient political concessions to depoliticise 
the conflict and transform the LTTE in a political direction. In 
retrospect, it can be concluded that this model was undermined 
by entrenched political dynamics that were furthered, rather than 
transformed, by the design of the peace process itself (Stokke and 
Uyangoda, 2011). I have observed elsewhere that political elites 
who were excluded from important and contentious processes of 
state reforms and intermediate Sinhalese classes that experienced 
social exclusion associated with market-led development, united in 
forceful opposition to the peace process, the government, and the 
international actors (Stokke, 2011). This political undermining of 
the peace process highlights the importance of substantive social 
and political inclusion to ensure sustainable and just peace. Sri 
Lanka’s peace process raises a number of questions about the 
degree to which internationalised crafting of liberal peace and, in 
particular, the Norwegian approach to peace can ensure this kind of 
social and political inclusion. The foremost lesson from Sri Lanka’s 
peace process is, in my view, that there is no short cut through 
narrowly defined and exclusionary elite negotiations to lasting 
peace with justice. This observation calls for careful analysis and 
strategic interventions to identify and further political dynamics 
that are conducive to positive peace. 
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Endnotes
1 It should be noted that the criticism that was voiced against Norway in the Israel-
Palestine Peace Process was overshadowed in Norwegian media and policy debate 
by the praise for Oslo process. It is difficult to find evidence that the critique affected 
Norwegian policy making in regard to the Sri Lankan peace process. 
2 The article is informed by my research on politics and development in Sri Lanka 
since the late 1980s and continuous attention to the politics of the peace process 
since 2001. It is also based on numerous meetings and conversations with 
miscellaneous actors and observers in the peace process. No individual sources are 
identified in the article for political reasons.  
3 Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the Labour Party gave leadership to 
peace engagement in this formative period: Thorvald Stoltenberg (1990-1993), 
Johan Jørgen Holst (1993-1994) and Bjørn Tore Godal (1994-1997). Jan Egeland 
functioned as State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997.
4 In addition to the legacy of consensus in foreign policy comes the fact that recent 
governments have had to rely on negotiations and strategic coalitions to mobilise a 
majority in Parliament. Norway has had five governments since 1990 where only the 
last one has had more than fifty percent of the seats in Parliament. These governments 
include a Labour Party government led by Gro Harlem Brundtland (1990-1997), 
a non-socialist coalition government consisting of the Christian Democratic Party, 
the Liberal Party and the Centre Party led by Kjell Magne Bondevik (1997-2000), 
a Labour Party government led by Thorbjørn Jagland (2000-2001), a non-socialist 
coalition government from the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party 
and the Liberal Party led by Kjell Magne Bondevik (2001-2005), and a red-green 
coalition government consisting of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the 
Centre Party led by Jens Stoltenberg (since 2005).
5 This argument has acquired a hegemonic position but is not uncontested. In 
addition to the realist critique of value diplomacy that was mentioned earlier, 
there is also an idealist critique of the instrumental use of peace engagement to 
promote Norway’s standing and influence in international arenas. Some critics have 
especially argued that there is a contradiction between appearance and essence in 
Norway’s peace engagement, as demonstrated by Norway’s participation in military 
operations in Afghanistan.
6 Such neo-corporatist arrangements between the state and civil society in 
engagement politics is sometimes presented as the core of the ‘Norwegian model’, 
emphasising lean bureaucracy and flexible governance networks in policy making 
and implementation.
7 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Eelam Revolutionary 
Organisation of Students (EROS), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), People’s 
Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organization (TELO)
8 The Government of Japan sought a facilitator role in the early stage of the process 
but this was not acceptable to the LTTE and India. The Government of India followed 
the conflict closely without being openly involved and the Norwegian facilitators 
maintained close contact and attained India’s support for the peace process.
9 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka/conf0306/declaration.html
10 This is an expression that has been used in several media appearances by Erik 
Solheim, Norway’s special envoy to Sri Lanka’s peace process.
11 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has initiated an international evaluation 
of Norway’s role in Sri Lanka’s peace process as a basis for possible reassessment 
and transformation of the Norwegian approach to peace. This evaluation is scheduled 
to be completed in mid-2011. 
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